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I. INTRODUCTION
Increased divorce rates and ready access to international
travel have contributed to the growing problem of national and
international child abduction The prime abductors are parents
who hope to gain full-time custody of their child by moving from
state to state to avoid detection or by moving to a new state and
establishing a "habitual" residence.! State or federal law must
resolve the resultant jurisdictional dilemma. If a parent takes a
child out of the United States, issues of international law
complicate the problem of jurisdiction.
"The touchstone concept of the Hague Convention is that it
was enacted to determine a choice between competing forums,
not a choice between competing parents."3 The goal of this law is
to return children to the factual setting that existed before their
wrongful removal or retention in another state or country.4 Once
a child is returned to his or her "habitual residence," the courts of
that state will determine the parental rights based on the laws of
the "home state" and hopefully in the "best interests of the child."
1. See Brenda J. Shirman, International Treatment of Child Abduction and the
1980 Hague Convention, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 188 (1991).
2. After one year, the courts of the newly acquired "home state" are hesitant to
disrupt the child's life with another change in custody, thereby giving an advantage to the
abducting parent.
3. The Honorable James D. Garbolino, Superior Court of the State of California,
Placer County, Cal., The Cause of Action for Return Under the Hague Convention When a
Child is Abducted to the United States: A View from the Bench 9 (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the University of Miami Inter-American Law Review).
4. See id.
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What is in the best interests of the child, however, is often
compromised in the attempt to address the jurisdictional
question. In most instances, the child has been removed from his
habitual residence without warning! Unless the child is an
infant or very young, this is a traumatic occurrence.' The child
needs a streamlined mechanism for quick return to his habitual
residence.
Recent events provide a prime example of how the best
interests of an abducted child often take a back seat to
jurisdictional issues. On Thanksgiving Day, 1999, a six-year old
Cuban child named Elian Gonzalez arrived in U.S. waters
clinging to an inner tube off of the beach in Fort Lauderdale,
Florida. The child had left Cuba with his mother on a small boat
that had capsized in rough waters, killing his mother.8 According
to Elian's father, Juan Miguel Gonzalez, the mother had taken
Elian on the voyage to America without his consent and now the
father wants Elian returned to Cuba.9 As of the writing of this
comment, Elian is being held in Virginia, the subject of a political
tug-of-war extending from Cuba, through Miami, and up to
Washington D.C.
This comment will discuss the plight of Elian Gonzalez and
other children by exploring three statutes that address the
procedures for returning abducted children to their "home state."
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act of 1968 (UCCJA), °
5. See Robin Jo Frank, Note, American and International Responses to Child
Abductions, 16 N.Y.U J. OF INT'L L. & POL. 415, 416 n.3 (1984).
6. See Julia A. Todd, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction: Are the Convention's Goals Being Achieved? 2 IND. J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD., 565 (1995). Loss of the primary custodial parent causes disruption, even if the
abducting parent played an important role in the child's life to this point. Supportive
extended family members and friends are lost in an instant. If the abducting parent
decides to hide the child and remain on the run, new identities are created. The child
loses even the association with his own name and address and is forced to lie about who
he is. Even when the child remains at a new address and the left-behind parent learns
the child's location, unraveling the legal issues may be a slow process. Meanwhile, the
child has to adjust to new schools, new friends and an unfamiliar daily routine. See id.
7. See Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 4,
Gonzalez ex rel. Gonzalez v. Reno, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (No. 00-0206).
8. See id.
9. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Alternative Motion for Summary
Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive
Relief and Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 11, Gonzalez ex rel. Gonzalez v. Reno, 86 F.
Supp. 2d 1167 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (No. 00-0206).
10. 9 U.L.A. § 115 (1988).
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the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA)," and
the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction (Hague Convention)'2 each have specific functions to
assist the legal system in resolving the confusion that occurs
when the child is taken across state or national lines.
Part II will begin by addressing the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act,
and will explore how the two work in tandem to resolve
jurisdictional conflicts between states prior to determining the
question of child custody. Part III will explain the applicability
of the Hague Convention in reducing the jurisdictional red tape
of international abductions. Part III will also highlight the
exceptions to the Convention and discuss how the procedure
differs in cases involving non-contracting states. Part IV will
demonstrate through case analysis that, although the emphasis
of each document is the jurisdictional decision, the custody issues
influence and complicate the outcome of the case.
II. LEGAL MECHANISMS AVAILABLE TO U.S. PARENTS OF AN
ABDUCTED CHILD TAKEN ABROAD
A. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
Before 1968, parents who abducted their children after
separation or divorce had an excellent chance of being rewarded
custody of their children."3 State courts had virtually unlimited
discretion to refuse to recognize or enforce custody decrees of
sister states and foreign nations. 4 Courts tended to give great
weight to the presence of the child in the state when making
custody determinations. 5 This encouraged forum shopping by
11. § 8(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
12. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, opened
for signature Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Hague
Convention].
13. See Patricia M. Hoff, Parental Kidnapping: Prevention and Remedies 2
(presented at the Annual Conference of the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts,
May 11, 1994) (on file with the University of Miami Inter-American Law Review).
14. See Esther Levy Blynn, In re: International Child Abduction v. Best Interests of
the Child: Comity Should Control, 18 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 353, 356 (1986) (citing
Note, Law and Treaty Responses to International Child Abductions, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 669,
670 (1980)).
15. Id. (citing Patricia M. Hoff, Child Snatching: Interstate and International Child
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allowing the abducting parent to find a state that permitted the
parent to remain legally unchallenged." If the child-snatcher
was able to retain the child for a considerable length of time, he
or she could argue the child should remain in the new
jurisdiction for stability and security.17 The result was that child
abductors would be rewarded "in the best interests of the child.""
Before widespread adoption of the UCCJA, courts gave only
lip service to the "best interests of the child" and frequently
refused to recognize custodial decisions of other jurisdictions,
essentially allowing abducting parents to manipulate the
custodial determinations. 9 There was a void in the federal
scheme to stop child snatching because there was no uniform
method of dealing with the violation from state to state.2u There
was a crying need for establishment of a national standard.
Recognizing this, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws drafted the UCCJA to create a national
standard to deter parental child abduction." By limiting
jurisdiction of custody matters to the courts of a single state,
efforts to litigate related custody matters in more than one
jurisdiction were thwarted.22 Under the UCCJA, a court only has
jurisdiction to make a custody determination if (1) the state is
the home state of the child at the time of the commencement of
the proceeding; (2) the child and his parent or his custodian have
a significant connection with the state; (3) the child is physically
present in the state and has been abandoned or subject to
mistreatment, abuse, or neglect; or (4) if no other state would
have jurisdiction under (1), (2), or (3)2
These uniform criteria for selecting the appropriate forum
help to avoid jurisdictional competitions and prevent forum
shopping. By prohibiting a second court from assuming
Custody Litigation, in INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES 10
(ABA Monograph, 4th ed. 1984).




20. See Toby Solomon, Interstate Custody: The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act 1 (unpublished manuscript on file with
the University of Miami Inter-American Law Review).
21. See id.
22. See Blynn, supra note 14, at 361.
23. See UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT OF 1968, 9 U.L.A. § 3(a) (1988).
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jurisdiction once litigation has commenced, the UCCJA promotes
cooperation between jurisdictions and facilitates enforcing
decrees of sister states.24 The UCCJA also codified the "clean
hands" principle where the state to which an abducting parent
flees is required to decline jurisdiction, thereby preventing the
child-snatcher from benefiting from his or her wrongdoing."
This Act has been adopted by every state and territory, and,
although there are some troublesome variations among the
different states, the overall acceptance has proved to be a major
deterrent to interstate kidnapping in this country.0
Pryor v. Pryor" is a good example of how the proper
application of the UCCJA by a trial court can resolve competing
child custody orders issued by different states.29 Pryor involved a
husband who sought dissolution of marriage in an Indiana
court.2' The Indiana court issued a temporary restraining order
granting the husband temporary custody of the child. ° The
husband then subpoenaed his wife to appear at the Indiana
hearing by sending the subpoena to her home in Kentucky,
where she and the child had been living for the past year."2 The
wife, however, filed a petition for divorce in a Kentucky court also
seeking custody of the child.2 When she appeared at the Indiana
provisional hearing without counsel, she failed to notify the court
of her pending petition in Kentucky." The Indiana court granted
the husband temporary custody of the child, which required the
wife to turn over custody. 4
24. See Solomon, supra note 20, at 1.
25. See UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT, supra note 23, § 8. Section 8
permits the court to decline jurisdiction if the petitioner comes to the court with "unclean
hands." For instance if the child has been abducted, or otherwise improperly retained the
child from the custodial parent. See id; Walsh v. Walsh, 80 A.D. 2d 894 (N.Y. App. Div.
1981).
26. See Solomon, supra note 20, at 1.
27. 709 N.E. 2d 374 (Ind. App. 1999).
28. Paul A. Leonard, Jr., Family Law Case Update, 43-JUL RES GESTAE 30, 34
(1999).





34, See id. at 375-76.
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Immediately after the Indiana hearing, the Kentucky court
issued a custody order in favor of the wife." Relying on
Kentucky's ruling, the wife refused to give the child to the
father.36 Once the Indiana court held her in contempt, she then
filed a "Motion for Relief from Orders and to Stay Proceedings"
advising the Indiana court of the Kentucky custody order."
Despite her argument that the child had lived in Kentucky for
almost one year prior to the husband's Indiana petition, the
wife's motion was denied and the child was placed with the
father.38
On appeal, the wife argued that the Indiana court "failed to
uphold its affirmative duty to question its jurisdiction when it
discovered that the custody dispute had an interstate
dimension." 9 The Indiana Court of Appeals remanded the case
for a hearing on whether Indiana or Kentucky had jurisdiction
and also whether Kentucky had declined its jurisdiction."0 The
appeals court retained jurisdiction to verify the custody order if
Indiana was found to have jurisdiction under the UCCJA.4"
This case demonstrates the required procedures under the
UCCJA for establishing which state has jurisdiction. By
assuring that the litigation of parental issues occurs in the child's
"home state" where the family has its closest connection, the
UCCJA ensures that the state which can best decide the case in
the interests of the child is the state that issues the custody
order. Additionally, by encouraging custody decisions to be made
where only one party may have that home base, the Act hopes to
deter abductions to other states or re-litigation of custody
decisions in other states." A key benefit of the Act is the
exchange of information between courts of each state, allowing
the enforcement of custody decrees of sister states.43
One glaring shortcoming of the UCCJA, however, is that it
does not provide a time limit in which jurisdiction petitions in





40. See id. at 378.
41. See id.




child abduction cases must be processed. To truly be in the best
interests of the child, a court should determine jurisdiction
quickly to move the process to the proper state for custodial
consideration. A six-week time limit would be appropriate for
expeditious implementation of child abduction laws because this
would correspond to the time period under the Hague Convention
for implementing communication between nations.4
B. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA)45
provides the federal enforcement mechanism for ensuring that
states honor the custody determinations of other states." The
key provision requires the courts of every state to enforce, rather
than modify custody and visitation orders made by courts already
exercising jurisdiction.47
This provision was maintained in Thompson v. Thompson,48
where the Supreme Court held that there is no federal cause of
action under the PKPA for determining which of two conflicting
state custody decisions is valid.49 In Thompson, a California
court awarded custody of a child, pending an investigator's
report, to the mother who planned to move to Louisiana.0 Once
in Louisiana, the mother obtained a Louisiana court order
enforcing the California custody decree and awarding her sole
custody.5 After this order had been entered, the California court
received the investigator's report and reversed its order granting
temporary custody to the mother and awarded sole custody to the
father. 2 Instead of attempting to enforce the California decree in
Louisiana, the father filed a suit in federal district court to
negate the Louisiana decree, to declare the California decree
valid, and to enjoin the enforcement of the Louisiana decree.53
The district court dismissed the complaint, and the court of
44. See Hague Convention, supra note 12, art. 11.
45. Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
46. See Solomon, supra note 20, at 8.
47. See id.; Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, supra note 45, § 1738A(a).
48. 484 U.S. 174(1988).
49. See id. at 176.
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appeals affirmed on the ground that he had failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted." Thus, Thompson limited
the power of the federal courts to intervene in a state jurisdiction
issue concerning child custody cases.
As explained by the Supreme Court, "Once a state exercises
jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the [PKPAI, no
other State may exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the custody
dispute, even if it would have been empowered to take
jurisdiction in the first instance, and all States must accord full
faith and credit to the first State's ensuing custody decree.""
The PKPA flatly prohibits concurrent jurisdiction and
protects the exclusive jurisdiction of the state that issued the
decree. The PKPA protects the continuing jurisdiction of the
decree state to modify the original custody decree as long as (1)
the initial custody order was made consistent with the PKPA's
jurisdictional hierarchy, (2) the state issuing the original decree
continues to have a basis for exercising custody jurisdiction
under state law (which need no longer be the "home state"), and
(3) the state remains the residence of the child or of any custody
contestant.56
Although the PKPA is primarily concerned with the
enforcement of jurisdiction, the Act does take the child into
consideration. "Under the Act, jurisdiction can turn on the
child's 'best interests' or on the proof that the child has been
abandoned or abused.""7 The effect of Thompson was not only to
limit concurrent jurisdiction between the states, but also to keep
the parties from bouncing from state to state and finally into
federal court to delay the proceedings.
The PKPA differs from the UCCJA in that it does not require
U.S. courts to give full faith and credit to foreign custody
54. See id.
55. See id. at 177 (citing Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. §
1738A(g) (1994)) (internal citations omitted).
56. See Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a), (d)
(1994).
57. See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 186 (citing Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of
1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B), (C), (D) (1994)).
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decrees.58 It therefore provides no remedy in international child
custody situations.
In 1993, Congress enacted the International Parental
Kidnapping Crime Act (IPKA),6° making it a federal criminal
offense for a parent to wrongfully remove or retain a child
outside U.S. borders when the Hague Convention cannot be
implemented.61 Congress reasoned that the United States could
request extradition of abducting parents from countries with
which the United States has extradition treaties.62  Once
international parental child abduction becomes a federal criminal
offense, presumably the federal government will become more
active in pursuing the parent and seeking the aid of the foreign
governments.'
Although IPKA is a step in the right direction, federal law is
by its nature limited to the United States. When an U.S. parent
and child are residing in a foreign state, that state is not required
to comply with U.S. laws' unless another agreement exists
between the United States and that foreign state. One such
agreement designed to create a network of international child
abduction laws is the Hague Convention.65
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE HAGUE CONVENTION
A. Adaptation of the Hague Convention into United
States Law
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction66 (hereinafter Convention) became law in the
58. See Susan L. Barone, International Parental Child Abduction: A Global
Dilemma with Limited Relief- Can Something More Be Done? 8 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 95, 99
(1995).
59. See id.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1204 (1993).
61. See id. § 1204(a) ("Whoever removes a child from the United States or retains a
child (who has been in the United States) outside the United States with intent to
obstruct the lawful exercise of parental rights shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than 3 years, or both.").
62. See Barone, supra note 58, at 99.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 99-100.
65. See id. at 99.
66. Hague Convention, supra note 12.
[Vol. 31:2
2000] JURISDICTION IN CUSTODY DISPUTES 333
United States in July 1988. The Convention is not an extradition
treaty, but a civil remedy for abduction."7 The Convention does
not provide authority for one state to require another foreign
state to extradite a parent.68 Also, a state is only bound if it
enacts domestic law adopting the Convention, because the
Convention is not self-executing."
In 1988, Congress enacted the International Child Abduction
Remedies Act (ICARA)7" to implement and maintain "uniform
international interpretation" of the Convention in the United
States. Subsequently, U.S. courts, when dealing with
international claims of child abduction, have held that the
Convention, as implemented by ICARA, preempts the UCCJA. 2
This legislation sets the legal parameters for the exercise of
judicial discretion, such as reinstating the legal status quo that
existed prior to the wrongful conduct. 3 The main purpose is to
ensure that the abducted or wrongfully detained child is
promptly returned to the country of habitual residence. 4
67. See Public Notice 957, Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text
and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10494, 1005 (1986).
68. Barone, supra note 58, at 101.
69. See id. at 101-102.
70. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (1996).
71. Id. § 11601(b)(3)(B).
72. See Moshen v. Moshen, 715 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (D. Wyo. 1989) (holding ICARA,
itself, does not provide rights under Hague Convention, but courts are empowered to
fashion provisional remedies under Hague Convention).
73. See Garbolino, supra note 3, at 9.
74. See Robert D. Arenstein, The Hague Convention - Understanding and Litigating
Under the Treaty 87, 1992 (unpublished article on file with the University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review).
In recommending the Convention to the U.S. Senate for ratification, President
Ronald Reagan described its goals as follows:
The Convention is designed promptly to restore the actual situation that
existed prior to a child's removal or retention. It does not seek to settle
disputes about legal custody rights, nor does it depend upon the existence of
court orders as a condition for returning children. The international abductor
is denied legal advantage from the abduction to or retention in the country
where the child is located, as resort to the Convention is to effect the child's
swift return to his or her circumstances before the abduction or retention. In
most cases this will mean return to the country of the child's habitual
residence where any dispute about custody can be heard and settled. The
Convention calls for the establishment of a Central Authority in every
Contracting State to assist applicants in securing the return of their children
or in exercising their custody or visitation rights, and to cooperate and
coordinate with their counterparts in other countries toward these ends.
Moreover, the Convention establishes a judicial remedy in wrongful removal
or retention cases which permits an aggrieved parent to seek a court order for
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
The threshold issue under the Convention is not who will
retain custody of the child, but what jurisdiction will make the
custody determination. The Convention struck a delicate
balance, protecting the factual situation altered by the wrongful
removal or retention of a child under age sixteen" and
guaranteeing respect for the legal relationships of the countries
which may underlie such abductions.76  The Convention
developed rules for returning a child as quickly as possible to the
pre-abduction status quo, where custody issues could be
determined according to the laws of that forum.77 The drafters
recognized that international abductions could not be handled
unilaterally by any one of the legal systems involved.78 The goal
of the Convention is to guarantee Cooperation among many
nations, and ultimately all nations, to expeditiously return the
child to the habitual residence for custodial consideration.
B. Requirements of the Hague Convention
The Convention requires that both the "home" state and the
foreign state be signators of the Convention at the time of the
abduction.79  Thus, the Convention was not automatically
triggered in the Elian Gonzalez case because, although the
United States was a signator of the Convention, Cuba was not.
In the absence of an international agreement, the United States
turned to its own laws under the INA to determine Elian's rights.
the prompt return of the child when voluntary agreement cannot be achieved.
An aggrieved parent may pursue both of these courses of action or seek a
judicial remedy directly without involving the Central Authority of the
country where the child is located.
Letter of Transmittal from President Ronald Reagan (Oct. 30, 1985), 51 Fed. Reg. 10,495
(1986).
75. The Hague Convention states, "The Convention shall apply to any child who was
habitually resident in a Contracting State immediately before any breach of custody or
access rights. The Convention shall cease to apply when the child attains the age of 16
years." Hague Convention, supra note 12, art. 4.
76. See Elisa PNrez-Vera, Explanatory Report, in 3 ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DE LO
QUATORZIEME SESSION 426, 428 (Permanent Bureau of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law ed. 1980) [hereinafter Prez-Vera Report].
77. See id. at 430.
78. See id.
79. See Hague Convention, supra note 12, art. 8 ("This convention shall apply as
between Contracting States only to wrongful removals or retentions occurring after its
entry into force in those States.").
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The INA does not require that proceedings be commenced
against Elian.5' In fact, Attorney General Janet Reno and the
INS Commissioner Doris Meissner chose not to commence
proceedings "in view of Elian's young age, in view of all that he
has been through, and in view of the fact that his father has
withdrawn his application for admission."8 INA § 242(g) bars
judicial review of "any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien
arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute orders
against any alien." 2 Both Meissner and Reno were confident of
the father's very close relationship with Elian and agreed that
the first responsibility of the government when dealing with an
unaccompanied minor was to find the parent or legal guardian,
even if the person was outside the United States. 3
Immediately following the decision of the INS that Elian
should be returned to Cuba, the political maneuvering began.
Indiana Representative, Dan Burton, "issued a congressional
subpoena designed to freeze Elian's repatriation, at least until
his Miami relatives had a chance to appeal it in court."' The
Miami relatives filed a petition in Miami-Dade Circuit Court and
received emergency custody, which opened the door for them to
petition for temporary custody in March 2000.8" Reno indicated
that this ruling carried no legal weight in an immigration
dispute."6
"Senate Foreign Relations chairman Jesse Helms announced
plans to make Elian a U.S. citizen when Congress reconvened on
Jan. 24-a move that could stall repatriation procedures.'
Further complicating matters, Elian's Miami relatives filed suit
in federal court against Reno and Meissner seeking a political
asylum hearing."8 They hoped to speed up the timetable usually
80. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 34.
81. Id.
82. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (1994).
83. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 30-31.
84. Joshua Cooper Ramo, A Big Battle for a Little Boy, TIME MAG., Jan. 17, 2000, at
61.
85. See Tony Doris, Trying Reason in Elian's Custody Case, MIAMI DAILY Bus. REV.,
Jan. 13, 2000, at Al.
86. See id.
87. Ramo, supra note 84, at 62.
88. See Motion for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction and Petition for Writ of
Mandamus and Supporting Memorandum of Law, Gonzalez ex rel. Gonzalez v. Reno, 86 F.
335
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afforded Cuban exiles under the 1966 Adjustment Act which
grants U.S. residency to all Cubans one year after their arrival in
the United States-a special treatment accorded to Cuba's
victims of "communist oppression. " "
The emotional frenzy that developed between the Cuban
exile community in Miami and the U.S. government added to the
legal complexity. Street demonstrations hindered passage of
non-involved citizens and pitted Americans against Cuban-
Americans, turning the issue into a political hot potato." An
investigation was launched against the circuit court judge who
issued the emergency custody order on the grounds of a potential
violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics for failing to disclose
that the family's spokesperson had previously served as her
political consultant for her election campaign.91 In addition, a
federal judge recused himself because the same consultant
handled a judicial campaign for the judge's son.9" The case
became more complicated when the federal court hearing had to
be reassigned three times because the judge suffered a stroke."
Finally, the case was heard before a newly appointed federal
judge six weeks later. 4 The federal hearing took place on the
same week as the state hearing for temporary custody.
95
The turmoil exploded beyond the streets of Miami.
Demonstrations occurred in Havana over the plight of Elian,
demanding his return to Cuba. When Elian's grandmothers
returned to Cuba after lobbying for Elian's release on Capitol
Hill, they were heralded in a parade and interviewed by the
media for days.96
Supp. 2d 1167 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (No. 00-0206).
89. Ramo, supra note 84, at 67.
90. See Gail Epstein Nieves, Police: Tear Gas Used as Protests Became Hostile,
MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 8, 2000, at lB.
91. See Tim Padgett, The Family Feuds, TIME MAG., Jan. 24, 2000, at 32-33.
92. See Jay Weaver, Judge Removes Self- Case Reassigned, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 22,
2000, at 1A.
93. See Marika Lynch, Hoeveler, Judge in Elian Case, in Hospital, MIAMI HERALD,
Feb. 21, 2000, at lB.
94. See Rick Bragg, Federal Judge Fails to Rule on Fate of Cuban Youngster, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2000, at A12.
95. See Ana Aele, Alfonso Chardy et al., Great-Uncle Given Temporary Custody:
Ruling Sets up Legal Showdown, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 11, 2000, at lB.
96. See John Rice, Boy's Grandmothers Cheered as Heroines Back in Havana, MIAMI
HERALD, Jan. 31, 2000, at lB.
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As the smoke cleared, the real problem emerged: a lack of
applicable regulations to deal with jurisdictional and custodial
issues when countries fail to sign or comply with treaties such as
the Hague Convention. At this point it was too late for the
Cuban government to accede to the Convention because it applies
"only to wrongful removal or retention after its entry into force. '
1. The Age Requirement
Article Four of the Convention provides, "The Convention
shall cease to apply when the child attains the age of 16 years." "
In the case of In re Walter Polovchak," age was a critical factor
because the child was only twelve when, having come to the
United States with his parents from the Ukraine, the child chose
to remain here when his parents decided to return home." With
the help of other family members, the child obtained an order
from a juvenile court judge making him a ward of the state on
the grounds that he was "beyond the control" of his parents.101
Additionally, a federal court granted the child asylum without
regard for the procedural and substantive rights of his parents in
the Ukraine."2
In Polovchak, established law took a back seat to the
political tension between the United States and the former Soviet
Union. Initially, the INS supported the child's separation from
his parents.' Ultimately, both the Illinois Supreme Court and
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found substantial error in
this decision which led to a divided family."4 "However, by the
time the Seventh Circuit finally rendered its decision in 1985,
Walter was weeks shy of his eighteenth birthday and his parents
had long since returned to the Ukraine, rendering the award of
97. Hague Convention, supra note 12, art. 35 (emphasis added).
98. Hague Convention, supra note 12, art. 4.
99. 454 N.E. 2d 258 (111. 1983).
100. See Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d 731, 733 (7th Cir. 1985).
101. See In re Walter Polovchak, 454 N.E. 2d 258 (Ill. 1983). Ultimately, the Illinois
Supreme Court reversed this order. See id.
102. See Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d at 735.
103. Memorandum of Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or
Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment at 14, Gonzalez ex rel. Gonzalez v. Reno, 86 F.
Supp. 2d 1167 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (No. 00-0206).
104. See Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d at 736.
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any form of relief a practical impossibility. " 105 Both the state and
federal appellate courts were accomplices in the illegal
destruction of a family because they failed to move expeditiously
to reverse actions that were clearly without legal foundation."6
Unlike the child in Polovchak, who, at age twelve, was at
least arguably competent to participate in a decision about where
he wanted to live, this argument cannot be made with respect to
six-year-old Elian.' The Seventh Circuit found that Walter at
twelve was "near the lower end of an age range in which a minor
may be mature enough to assert certain individual rights that
equal or override those of his parents."' However, a credible
authority on child development states,
we do not believe that there are or can be circumstances which
justify emancipating children to meet their own legal care
needs in the child placement process. Indeed, it is the purpose
of the process to secure or restore for every child an
uninterrupted opportunity to be represented by "parents."0 9
2. The Wrongful Removal or Retention Requirement
For a left-behind parent to invoke the Convention, that
parent must be acting under rights of custody and must prove
wrongful removal or retention.10 "The Hague Convention defines
wrong removal or retention as a violation of a person's custody
right, under the law of the abducted child's 'habitual residence'
state, prior to the removal or retention.""' "[it is therefore
necessary to determine the right of custody and 'habitual
residence' of the child.""'
105. Memorandum of Amici Curiae, supra note 103, at 15 (internal citation omitted).
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. Id. (quoting Polovchak v. Meese, 774 F.2d at 737).
109. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ALBERT J. SOLNIT ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD: THE LEAST DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 147 (1996). See also Bellotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 635 (1979) ("[D] uring the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors
often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that
could be detrimental to them."); Prez-Funez v. INS, 619 F. Supp. 656, 662 (C.D. Cal.
1985) (even minors over 14 have been found to be unable to comprehend voluntary
removal process with sufficient clarity to avoid risk of coercion).




20001 JURISDICTION IN CUSTODY DISPUTES 339
Had the Convention been applicable to the Elian case, the
requirement that a child be returned to his or her habitual
residence would surely mean that Elian should be returned to
Cuba because this was his only home for the first five years of his
life. Regardless of whether Cuba is a member of the Hague
Convention, international law has a strong basis for returning
Elian to his home in Cuba because his only surviving parent lives
in Cuba.
C. Exceptions to The Hague Convention's Focus on
the Best Interests of the Child
Once the requirements of wrongful removal and retention
under the Hague Convention are proved by a preponderance of
the evidence,' 3 the abducting parent must return the child unless
one of the Convention's exceptions applies. These exceptions are
set forth in articles twelve, twenty, and thirteen of the
Convention and are "designed to be interpreted narrowly because
a broad construction would defeat the purpose of the
Convention.""4
1. Article Twelve
Article twelve allows the fact that a child abducted more
than one year ago has now settled into a new environment to
overcome the Convention's provisions."' The delegates added
this one-year statute of limitations to the Convention because
they felt that a failure by the left-behind parent to bring a swift
application might indicate acquiescence in, or mixed emotions
about the abduction."6 They also feared that ordering a return at
such a late date might cause additional confusion and
psychological damage to the child." '
This one-year exception has been criticized because the
abducting parent could delay the proceedings by concealing the
113. International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(B) (1996).
114. Barone, supra note 58, at 109.
115. Hague Convention, supra note 12, art. 12.
116. See Todd, supra note 6.
117. See id.
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whereabouts of the child for more than a year and then attempt
to benefit from the use of Article Twelve.'18
2. Article Twenty
Article Twenty contains the Convention's public policy
exception. It states, "[t]he return of the child under the
provisions of Article Twelve may be refused if this would not be
permitted by the fundamental principles of the Requested State
relating to the protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms."" 9 On its face, it appears that if Cuba were a signator
of the Convention, the United States would have been able to use
Article Twenty to keep Elian Gonzalez in this country.
Ideologically, the United States believes that his human rights
and fundamental freedoms would be restricted under a
communist regime such as the Cuban government. However,
this exception "was intended to be restrictively interpreted and
applied, and is not to be used, for example, as a vehicle for
litigating custody on the merits or for passing judgment on the
political system of the country from which the child was
removed.""' "In order to invoke the 'fundamental principles'
exception, it must be demonstrated that the return of the child
would violate an actual domestic law of that state."2' In other
words, the United States would have to have a law forbidding
any child on our soil to be returned to a communist country. "It
would not be enough for the state to say that the exception will
violate its policy or custom.""'
When countries have differing ideologies, children become
political "footballs." This usually results in poor legal decisions
and has detrimental psychological effects on the child. This was
the case in In re Walter Polovchak,"' where the political
ideologies between the Soviet Union and the United States in
1980 encouraged the court to support twelve-year-old Walter's
request to remain in the United States. Unfortunately, this led
to the elimination of his family unit.
118. See id.
119. Hague Convention, supra note 12, art. 20.
120. Todd, supra note 6, at 566.
121. Barone, supra note at 58, at 110.
122. Id.
123. 454 N.E. 2d 258 (Ill. 1983).
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Political considerations have impacted the resolution of
Elian's case as well. The political maneuvering has caused the
INS, the Attorney General, and the courts to move abnormally
slow in this case to the detriment of Elian and his family. If the
political issues were removed, all legal rules are open to the best
interests of the child. Most countries share the commitment to
parenthood even though they may be politically at odds. By
precluding political meddling, a court could rely on the
customary ideology of keeping a child with a parent in the only
home he has previously known. Unfortunately, the words "in the
best interests of Elian" seem inappropriate as this charade is
paraded before the media.
3. Article Thirteen
a. Article 13(a) - No Custodial Rights or Acquiescence
at Time of Wrongful Removal or Retention
Under Article 13(a) of the Convention, a court may deny an
application for the return of a child if the petitioner was (1) not
actually exercising custody rights at the time of removal or
retention, or (2) if the petitioner had acquiesced in the removal or
retention. Although this rule appears clear-cut, judicial reading
of the custody laws can vary depending upon the interpretation
by the Requesting State. Thus, a court could exercise its bias
against the petitioner or the petitioner's country through its
interpretation of the custody law in the State of habitual
residence."'
For example, in David S. v Zamira S.125 the mother argued
that, under a valid separation agreement, the father had only
access rights (as opposed to custody rights) over their son, and
therefore, was not entitled to the child under the Convention.
Although the court recognized the validity of the mother's
argument under Article 13(a), the court ordered the son returned
to the father because the mother violated the separation
agreement by removing the boy from the habitual residence
area.12 This harsh and narrow interpretation of what constitutes
124. See Todd, supra note 6, at 569.
125. 574 N.Y.S.2d 429, 432 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1991).
126. See id. at 432-33.
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a right of custody stems from the court's intolerance for
violations of Article Three of the Convention, which prohibits
wrongful removal or retention of children.'27
In In re J.,'28 the United Kingdom Court of Appeal's
interpretation of custody rights under Australian law also
evidences the manipulability of the law and the potential for
bias. Under Australian law, custody and guardianship of a child
are granted to the mother unless a court orders otherwise. 9 The
father in this case successfully petitioned the court for custody
after the mother left Australia with the child and moved to the
United Kingdom.' The court, however, indicated that the
removal or retention was not wrongful under the Convention
because the father did not have custody rights before the mother
removed the child.'3 '
Denying an application for the return of a child on the
ground that the petitioner acquiesced in the child's removal or
retention is also sufficiently vague as to permit bias. In
Schroeder v. Vigil-Escalera Perez 32 the wife, a citizen of Ohio,
and the husband, a citizen of Spain, were married in Mexico.
The couple had a child while in Mexico, making the child a
citizen of the United States, Mexico, and Spain.
13 3
The family lived together in Madrid, Spain, until November
1994, when the wife and the child returned to the Unites States
for a temporary visit."' Because the marriage was in trouble, the
wife chose to remain in the United States with the child at the
encouragement of the husband. 3' The father never insisted that
the child be returned.1
6
Ultimately, the couple filed for divorce."7  The husband
agreed that the wife should have custody of the child as long as
they could work out visitation once the child was old enough to
127. See id.




132. 664 N.E.2d 627, 629 (Ct. of Common Pleas of Ohio 1995).
133. See id.
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travel. Six months later, however, the husband filed an action
for wrongful removal or retention under the Hague Convention in
U.S. federal district court.
39
Under the Convention, the threshold question is the habitual
residence of the child.' 40  This child lived in Mexico for five
months, in Spain for three months, and the United States for
seven months of her young life.'4' Being that "[t]here is no actual
definition of 'habitual residency' in the Hague Convention, 42 the
court determined that the key date was November 12, 1994,
when the wife and child left Spain with the knowledge and
consent of the husband because the father "clearly acquiesced in
the removal and retention of the child in the United States."
b. Article 13 (b) - Grave Risk of Harm
The Article 13(b) "grave risk of harm" exception is the most
frequently litigated because it comes the closest to allowing the
parties to argue the merits of the case instead of focusing on the
jurisdiction issue. '  This Article excuses the duty to return
under "a grave risk that returning the child would expose the
child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the
child in an intolerable situation." 4' This exception opens the
door to an endless list of possible grievances presented to
influence the court that the child will be better off remaining
with the abducting parent. The Convention strictly maintains
that any international analysis of the "merits of any custody
issue" is specifically precluded. 6 Yet, litigants will often try to
present evidence that will influence the judge's determination of
"best interests of the child" under the "grave risk of harm"
exception.
The abuse of this exception has led to accusations of not only
physical dangers for the child but psychological harm as well. In
138. See id.
139. See id. at 631.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 632.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 633.
144. See id. at 570.
145. Hague Convention, supra note 12, art. 13(b).
146. Id. art. 5.
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Tahan v. Duquette,147 the father alleged that the child would
suffer severe emotional harm if returned to the left-behind
parent. 14 The New Jersey Court of Appeals remanded the case to
the trial court, unaware that it would take seven months to
readdress the issue. 9 The counsel for the plaintiff planned to
call a myriad of witnesses to the proceeding to show "the grave
risk of psychological harm to [the child] if the court disrupts his
life now by compelling his return.""' "[Tihe trial court ruled that
an Article 13(b) inquiry ... was not intended to cover factual
matter which was subject to being considered in a plenary
custody hearing."' Hearing such testimony would usurp the
jurisdiction "reserved by the Convention to the courts of
Quebec.""'
Article 13(b) inquiries are not intended to deal with issues or
factual questions that belong in the custody hearing but instead
should focus on the question "whether there exists in the place of
habitual residence such 'internal strife' or unrest as to place the
child at risk."53 This narrow inquiry allows the court to focus
exclusively on the jurisdictional issue and not upon the
individuals.'
The Miami relatives of Elian Gonzalez stressed to the court
that they believed Elian would suffer grave danger and loss of his
rights if he was returned to Cuba. In a pleading filed in the
Family Division of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, the
relatives outlined the "nature of the emergency and the reasons
requiring immediate action by this Court to prevent imminent
harm to the Minor child.""5 The petitioner suggested that a
parent in Cuba did not have the ability to raise a child free of
coercion, duress or threat of persecution, and was subject to
147. 613 A.2d 486 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
148. See id. at 488.
149. See id.
150. Id. at 488. The witnesses included: a psychologist who prepared an evaluation of
the parties and the child; the plaintiff and his present wife, who would attest to the child's
"dreams and his desires, his nightmares and fears," as well as his family relationships;
and the child's teacher. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 489.
153. Id.
154. See id.
155. Verified Petition for Temporary Custody and Other Relief at 6-7, Gonzalez ex rel.
Gonzalez v. Reno, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (No. 00-0206).
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manipulation by the government.' The petitioner was prepared
to provide testimony by psychologists as to the boy's "View of his
life in Cuba and his genuine fear of returning to a world that can
only be described as a living hell."15 '
On January 10, 2000, a judge in Family Division granted
temporary custody to Elian's great-uncle Lazaro Gonzalez
because the presentation of the evidence on the merits is
appropriate in Family Court.' 5 The INS and Attorney General
failed to acknowledge the validity of the state court action1 59 and
on April 13, 2000, the Family Division entered a final order
declaring that the matter of temporary custody of Elian by his
great-uncle Lazaro was "federally pre-empted and that the court
further lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore dismisses
this action and terminates the order of January 10, 2000."'60 The
ruling stressed that Elian's ability to remain in the United States
was not a custodial matter to be decided by a state court but
rather was a federal immigration issue of whether he should stay
in the United States or be sent back to Cuba.' Subsequently,
Elian's Miami relatives spelled out these same fears of grave
harm to Elian in a federal court Motion for Preliminary and
Permanent Injunction and Writ of Mandamus, which was
denied.'62
c. Article 13 - The Child's Objection Clause
Article Thirteen concludes with the child's objection clause,
allowing a court to deny a return petition if "the child objects to
being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity
at which it is appropriate to take account of its views. " 113 '"This
exception gives significant discretion to the court to determine
what age and level of maturity is required to make a decision of
156. See id. at 8.
157. Id. at 11.
158. See Gonzalez v. Gonzalez-Quintana, Case No. 00-00479-FC-29 (Fl. Cir. Ct. Fan.
Div. Jan. 10, 2000) available in 2000 WL 419688.
159. See Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 9, at 49-50.
160. In re Lazaro Gonzalez, Case No. 00-00479-FC-28, at 1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Family Div.
Apr. 13, 2000) available in 2000 WL 492102.
161. See id. at 8.
162. See Motion for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction and Petition for Writ of
Mandamus and Supporting Memorandum of Law at 1, 4, 5, 1, 22, 23, n.23, Gonzalez ex
rel. Gonzalez v. Reno, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (No. 00-0206).
163. Hague Convention, supra note 12, art.13.
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this sort."'' The problem arises when an abducting parent exerts
pressure on the child to state the parent's view rather than his
own. "However, consideration of the child's preference is not
mandatory, and courts can attach little weight to the child's
opinion if brainwashing by the abducting parent is suspected.
16
'
IV. Is RECONCILIATION OF "BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD"
AND JURISDICTIONAL CONCERNS POSSIBLE UNDER U.S. AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW?
The common thread running through the UCCJA, the PKPA,
and the Hague Convention is the threshold question of
jurisdiction. Once it is decided whether the home state or
habitual residence will have jurisdiction, that state will then
make the custodial determination in the best interests of the
child. Counselors and judges involved in UCCJA and Hague
Convention cases are warned that they must be vigilant in
stressing that these laws do not provide a forum for litigating the
merits of a custody dispute. 6' The paramount issue is whether
there was a wrongful removal or retention, not what is in the
best interests of the child.'67 One attorney, known as an expert at
handling Hague Convention trials, noted in his handbook the
following warning: "Best Interests. Stay away from this, avoid it,
do not let it come before the court. The Convention is not a best
interests test. Do not let this come in, object over and over to any
introduction of best interests. 68
The Convention's silence on this point does not mean that
the Convention ignores the necessity of considering the interests
of children. 9  Although the purpose of the Convention is
jurisdictional and not custodial, "the interests of the child are of
paramount importance in matters relating to custody," and the
problem emerges as one of perspective. "' Any designation of
jurisdiction should be subordinated to the interests of the child.''
164. Todd, supra note 6, at 573.
165. Id.
166. See Garbolino, supra note 3, at 23.
167. Prez-Vera Report, supra note 76, at 431.
168. William M. Hilton, Handling a Hague Trial, 6 AM. J. FAM. L. 211 (1992).
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Yet, the legal standard "the best interests of the child" is at
first view of such vagueness that it seems to resemble more
closely a sociological paradigm than a concrete juridical
standard. How can one put flesh on its bare bones without
delving into the assumptions concerning the ultimate interests of
a child which are derived from the moral framework of a
particular culture?'72 Would the interests be based on the
immediate aftermath of the decision, or on the latter effects on
the child in adolescence, young adulthood, maturity, or old age?" '
This question is particularly applicable to the case of Elian.
What is really in his best interest? He has lost his mother and
has been separated from the only family he ever knew before
November 1999. Perhaps Cuba would provide the most likely
forum for emotional and psychological healing. According to
University of Miami Psychiatrist Dr. Michael Hughes, when the
reality of what happened out in the ocean comes crashing down
on Elian, "he'll need to be with the father and grandparents who
have reared him.""' Yet, an unnamed U.S. official postured
Elian's thoughts at age twenty-one, "I'm condemned to a life
sitting on a seawall here in Havana with no job and under this
repressive dictatorship, and I could be at the University of Miami
right now."7'
Frequently, internal jurisdictions have considered the best
interests of the child, and have awarded the custody to the
parent who wrongfully removed or retained the child. 76
Although such a decision may not be invariably wrong, it does
enhance the risk that a court might be expressing particular
social or cultural attitudes based on nationalistic and subjective
values against the child's habitual residence.'77 It also reinforces
the very message that the Convention and the corresponding
state laws want to discourage, that a parent will be rewarded for
abducting the child from the custodial parent. Focusing on the
jurisdictional issue alone in the first instance allows the child
custody issue to be adjudicated in the child's home state. In most
instances, the familial resources for both parties located in the
172. See id. at 431.
173. See id.
174. Padgett, supra note 91.
175. Ramo, supra note 84, at 67.
176. See Perez-Vera Report, supra note 76, at 431.
177. See id.
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
home state will help the court to come to a fair decision in the
best interests of the child.
The return of the child to the habitual residence is one of
only two concrete and objective premises of the Convention. The
other is the age limit of sixteen years under Article Four."8 The
exceptions provided by the Convention open the discussion to
overwhelming subjectivity. Most courts explicitly recognize the
limitations of factoring in the child's best interests and only
consider it as one of many factors in determining whether to
return a child. 7' By concentrating on the habitual residence
question, the court is able to remove itself from consideration of
evidentiary material that is best presented at the custodial
hearing in the child's home state.8 '
Even though the best interests of the child analysis is
subjective, it is the motivation for implementing a timeliness
requirement under the Convention. Several articles under the
Convention implement an expeditious approach to resolving
disputes. Article Nine specifically states that the Central
Authority which receives an application for return of a child
"shall directly and without delay transmit the application to the
Central Authority of that Contracting State and inform the
requesting Central Authority, or the applicant."8' Article Ten
instructs "[tihe Central Authority of the State where the child is
shall take or cause to be taken all appropriate measures in order
to obtain the voluntary return of the child."'82 This is reiterated
in Article Eleven stating that when the application is received by
the judicial or administrative authorities of the Contracting
State, they should "act expeditiously, and must state reasons for
any delay if a decision has not been received by the requesting
State within six weeks."8 3 Additionally, Article Twelve gives the
authority requesting the return of the child the right to order
that return "forthwith" from the Contracting State where the
child is currently living. '
178. Hague Convention, supra note 12, art. 4.
179. See Garbolino, supra note 3, at 22.
180. See Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1993).
181. Hague Convention, supra note 12, art. 9.
182. Id. art. 10.
183. Id. art. 11.
184. Id. art. 12.
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One of the principal weaknesses of the Convention and its
ability to impact the UCCJA is the limited number of states that
have ratified it.' To date, fifty-four nations, including the
United States, have ratified the Hague Convention.' If more
international support is not achieved, non-participating nations
might well become notorious as havens for children snatchers."'
In the case of Elian, when only one country-the United
States-is a signator, the Convention becomes useless as a tool
for implementing the return of the child under a body of
international law.88 As an alternative to all countries acceding to
the Hague Convention, governments should, wherever possible,
consider ratifying other treaties or enter into bilateral
agreements in order to obtain more protection for their citizens
when children are abducted to foreign jurisdictions."'
Adoption of The Convention on the Rights of the Child'90
(Child's Rights Convention) would have the most significant
impact. 8' Ninety-two countries, including several Middle East
states such as Egypt and Jordan, have ratified the Child's Rights
Convention.'5 ' The United States has been unwilling to ratify the
Child's Rights Convention because it contains human rights
implications that might conflict with national security
concerns.' However, in the best interests of U.S. citizens and
especially our children, such treaties would be beneficial for the
185. See Blynn, supra note 14, at 382.
186. See Jess T. Ford, Assoc. Dir. Int'l Relations and Trade Issues, U.S. General
Accounting Office, Prepared Statement Before the House Committee on International
Relations (Oct. 14, 1999), available in Fed. News Serv., Oct. 14, 1999.
187. See Blynn, supra note 14, at 382.
188. See Motion for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction and Petition for Writ of
Mandamus and Supporting Memorandum of Law at 9 n.11, Gonzalez ex rel. Gonzalez v.
Reno, 86 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (No. 00-0206) ("Some commentators, however,
have incorrectly assumed the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction might apply to this case.... Cuba is not a signatory to the
Convention ... and Juan Miguel has no right under either the Convention or the Act.").
189. See Barone, supra note at 58, at 120.
190. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 28 I.L.M.
1448.
191. See Barone, supra note 58, at 120. See generally Cara L. Finan, Convention on
the Rights of the Child: A Potentially Effective Remedy in Cases of International Child
Abduction, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1007 (1994) (stating that in the United States alone,
there are up to 350,000 cases of domestic and international child abduction reported each
year).




left-behind parent to support arguments that an abducted child
should be returned.
1 94
Regional treaties, such as the Inter-American Convention on
the International Return of Children,195 are harmonious with the
Hague Convention since they share similar objectives."6 This
additional legal remedy closes one more loophole and creates one
less opportunity for the abducting parent to find a refuge to avoid
returning the child.'97 This is ultimately in the best interests of
the child.
Unless the government enacts legislation and provides
leadership in implementing that legislation, the problem of child
abductions will continue to grow. In 1988, the number of
national and international abductions was estimated at
350,000.' However, in her October 1999 report, Mary A. Ryan,
Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs for the State
Department, reported that in the ten years that the United
States has been party to the Convention, over 2,000 children
have been returned.9 Recognizing that the Convention is not
perfect, she noted that it does not always facilitate cases as it
should.Y° "The world has changed since the Convention was
conceived nineteen years ago when the majority of the abducting
parents were the fathers."20 ' Today seventy percent of the
abductors are mothers, and the courts in some countries are
reluctant to compel children to return to their fathers.'
194. See id. See also Finan, supra note 191, at 1030-32. But see Meredith v.
Meredith, 759 F. Supp. 1432, 1434 (D. Ariz. 1991) ("In order to invoke the Hague
Convention relief, petitioner must satisfy two threshold issues: (1) lawful rights of custody
at the time of removalfretention; and (2) that such removal or retention is from the child's
habitual residence.").
195. Inter-American Convention on the International Return of Children, July 15,
1989, 29 I.L.M. 66 (1990). The Organization of American States (OAS) implemented the
Inter-American Convention to avoid the additional requirements set forth in Article 32 of
the Hague Convention. Article 32 states, "In relation to a State which in matters of
custody of children has two or more systems of law applicable to different categories of
persons, any reference to the law of that State shall be construed as referring to the legal
system specified by the Law of that State."
196. See Barone, supra note 58, at 121.
197. See id.
198. See Finan, supra note 191.
199. See Mary A. Ryan, Assistant Sec. For Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State,
Prepared Statement Before the House Committee on International Relations (Oct. 14,
1999) available in Fed. News Serv., Oct. 14, 1999.
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Nevertheless, prior to the United States becoming a party to the
Convention, the return of abducted children was approximately
twenty percent.2 ' Today, about seventy-two percent of the cases
result in return or access."4 "The rate of return from the United
States to other countries is even higher, approximately ninety
percent, including voluntary returns.
However, the custody battle for Elian has created a tense
situation for many American parents trying to have their
children returned from spouses living abroad."6 Most parents
interviewed said they were fearful of other countries drawing
parallels between their cases and Elian's with the argument that
the child's life will be better in their country.0 7 Some parents
"have been told their child must stay in a foreign land because
it's a superior place to raise a child. Although many nations
routinely return children taken from the United States, and the
United States reciprocates, decisions are sometimes influenced
by nationalism, religion or mere caprice. The world is
watching how the United States responds in the case of Elian
Gonzalez to determine how they in turn should treat similar
situations.
By recognizing the various shortcomings of the three
statutes, the federal government has taken the first step to
address not only the jurisdictional issue but also to prioritize the
best interests of the child. However, with or without a legal
mechanism that works effectively and in a timely manner, the
left-behind parent and the child often have little recourse once
the jurisdiction is awarded to the home state or country of the
abducting parent. Often the only step remaining is self-help,
resulting in a re-kidnapping by the parent or a team of
professionally trained rescuers."9 Many cases have been resolved
in this way with parents turning to private mercenary groups
that perform dangerous and often illegal tasks to help bring the
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round of retaliation from the spouse, unless they are fortunate to
have the other parent arrested for kidnapping. The fear
disappears but the child continues to live without the support
and nurturing of one parent. Nobody wins.
In an interview, Juan Miguel Gonzalez, Elian's father,
indicated his frustration with the delays in returning his son to
Cuba.21' He suggested "that his U.S. kin were 'unfeeling'
accomplices to 'child abuse.' Then he mused that he might come
to Miami 'with a rifle and do away with' the Cuban exiles there
who are fighting to keep Elian in the U.S."""
Elian remains in limbo even though a federal judge
dismissed the lawsuit brought by the Miami relatives on the
grounds that the INS lacked the authority to reject the asylum
applications. The court was satisfied that it had subject matter
jurisdiction to consider the complaint and that Elian had
standing through his great-uncle, Lazaro Gonzalez, and was a
real party in interest in this complaint.214 In its analysis, the
court denied the plaintiffs claim of violation of constitutional due
process, indicating that under parole one does not receive
protected status.2"' In addition, the court concluded that the
Attorney General acted within her discretion to recognize only
the father's right to apply or not to apply for his son's asylum.216
Elian's Miami relatives appealed this decision to the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Atlanta, Georgia."' Despite
the pending appeal, the Attorney General and the INS indicated
that if the father came to get his son, they would turn the boy
over to him.2"' The father subsequently came to Washington,
D.C., in the hope of being reunited with his young son."'
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Negotiations to return the child to his father continued to
stall.2 ' The Attorney General set a deadline for the child to be
delivered to her chartered air flight at 2:00 p.m. the next day to
fly with her to Washington.' The deadline came and went with
no response from the Miami relatives.2
A federal appeals judge in Atlanta ruled that Elian might be
able to decide his future for himself and ordered Juan Miguel to
remain in the United States until after the May 11th appellate
hearing, even if Elian was turned over to him. '23 Meanwhile,
Reno met with President Clinton, who was growing impatient
with Reno's inaction, and laid out the plan for immediate rescue
of Elian."
Finally, after a frantic thirty-six hour negotiation involving
President Tad Foote of the University of Miami and a prominent
Miami attorney, Aaron Podhurst, the moment long dreaded
arrived.25  Federal marshals dressed in riot gear invaded the
Little Havana home of Lazaro Gonzalez at 5:00 a.m. on April 22,
2000, and seized the boy.226 He was reunited with his father that




The Elian Gonzalez case underscores the need for the United
States to enforce its laws expeditiously. When dealing with
children who have been taken from their habitual residence or
home state to another state or county without the consent of the
left-behind parent, time is of the essence. Although the Hague
Convention, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, and the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act are designed to return the
wrongfully removed or retained child to his home state for a
custodial hearing, these legal mechanisms have failed to expedite
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the system in a manner that is truly beneficial to the child. The
child's expeditious return is essential for his well being, and that
well being is compromised when various branches of government
and government agencies cannot determine proper legal
procedures or implement them.
Child custody disputes continue to occur regardless of state,
national or international laws. However, the United States has
taken a giant step in facilitating the return of many children to
their habitual residence and their custodial parents. It is
imperative that more countries become party to the Hague
Convention or a similar agreement with specific requirements to
return the child to his home state. In the meantime, the fact that
a parent's claim does not fall within the Hague Convention, as
with Cuba's non-signatory status, should not preclude the
availability of legal aid for the left-behind parent. Allowing a
jurisdictional question to turn into an international human
rights or political issue merely clouds the situation, making the
child a conduit for other agendas.
The case of Elian Gonzalez is testimony to the importance of
a government's need to have clearly defined rules and regulations
to eliminate confusion in child custody cases. The uncertainty for
the child and his family for an indefinite time period defeats the
urgency set down in Articles Nine, Ten and Eleven of the
Convention. The United States must adopt a time requirement
into the UCCJA to add more bite to that provision. Only then
will the "best interests of the child" become a stronger
consideration in this arduous process of jurisdictional and
custodial resolution.
Elian was fortunate that he was found alive and rescued
from the sea. However, U.S. immigration officials failed to use
good judgment when they turned Elian over to his Miami
relatives. The first consideration should have been to speak to
Elian's father in Cuba. If Juan Miguel Gonzalez had made the
decision to turn Elian over to his Miami relatives, the
government would have conducted its normal investigation and
then chosen its course of action. If the father decided to have the
boy returned to Cuba, the INS would have expedited his request
immediately. This would have resolved the situation according
to the laws established by the INS. However, these procedures
were not followed.
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Although the Eleventh Circuit has heard the oral arguments
from all parties, it has not ruled on whether a six-year-old child
can request asylum. Whatever the outcome of the hearing, only
one thing is certain: Elian's voyage should come to an end. He
should not have to continue floating aimlessly through U.S. and
international legal systems to place his feet on dry land at home.
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